Nuclear security

Working paper submitted by the European Union

1. The European Union believes that nuclear security is a matter of concern for all States and is not limited to those with large nuclear programmes. All States have the responsibility to act to establish appropriate regimes to prevent, detect and respond to malicious acts involving nuclear material and against the facilities in which they are legitimately produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of. The establishment of such a comprehensive nuclear security regime requires a multidisciplinary approach at a number of levels and using a variety of expertise.

2. The European Union recognizes and supports the international legal instruments designed to provide the obligations and guidance concerning the responsibility of States to establish and maintain an effective nuclear security regime. Early accession to and ratification of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, full implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1373 (2001) and of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements and further work towards implementing the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources would bring the international nuclear and radioactive security regime into significantly greater effect.

3. The European Union supports the efforts of IAEA, through its nuclear security fund, to spread the objectives and fundamental principles of nuclear and radioactive security to its wider membership. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources represent essential features of this work. The European Union encourages as many States as possible to ratify the amended Convention and observe the principles contained in the Code. It undertakes to promote the application of the amended Convention and the Code of Conduct collectively or individually, encouraging States to request the assistance of the Agency in this area, as necessary.

4. The European Union supports assistance for key States, in partnership with IAEA, in taking forward efforts to account for and securely manage all high-level
radioactive sources in their territory, including the search for and safe and secure recovery of sources no longer under regulatory control.

5. The European Union supports continued international discussion of means and methods to improve the coordination and information sharing between States parties. It seeks:

(a) To improve and coordinate best practice in nuclear and radioactive material security;

(b) To increase and improve collaboration between international donors over work to increase nuclear radiological security;

(c) To coordinate a sustainable approach by the international community through training of personnel and other methods.

6. States parties should make best efforts to engage in providing assistance to IAEA through support for the secondment of experts, training programmes, evaluation of national systems for the control of materials and sources, participation in campaigns for the detection and securing of uncontrolled sources and in technical cooperation projects for the supply of equipment for the detection of illegal movements of nuclear materials and radioactive sources.

7. States parties should seek to identify those elements of the IAEA Code of Conduct that are of greatest relevance to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear materials and radioactive sources and to develop plans for national approval on the implementation of those elements, in close consultation with IAEA. These plans could consider addressing, in particular:

(a) Establishing and maintaining a legal and regulatory framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources;

(b) Establishing a national register to track relevant sources throughout their life-cycle;

(c) Setting up a strategy for creating a national mechanism for the recovery and securing of “orphan” or poorly controlled sources within their national territory;

(d) Establishing a mechanism with respect to the control of exports of sources, attaching conditions to them, and means (e.g. notifications) for monitoring these exports;

(e) Developing national measures, as necessary, to combat malevolent acts involving radioactive sources; in particular taking steps (where necessary with the assistance of IAEA) to secure all high-level radioactive sources;

(f) Identifying possible measures to be taken by the State in order to safeguard and restrict access to sources and measures that the State could take regarding the conditioning and/or encouraging the recycling of sources at the end of their life;

(g) Putting in place a system to detect the passage of radioactive sources at strategic points such as border crossings.

8. International assistance aimed at key States, in association with IAEA, could focus in particular on:
(a) Campaigns to search for and locate orphan sources, based on information gathered locally or from the initial producer and/or exporter of these sources;

(b) Securing these sources onsite and, in extreme circumstances, evacuating them to specialized facilities;

(c) Installing appropriate instruments at border crossings and strategic points to detect illegal movements of radioactive materials.

9. The States that produce and distribute nuclear and radioactive sources have a special responsibility with regard to the safety and security of these sources. Producers and exporting States must give consideration to the type and nature of commitment the radioactive or nuclear source producer and/or users and importing States might enter into. This commitment could include an individual declaration by these States to IAEA, in which they affirm their determination to uphold the “principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources”.