



European Union

**EU General Statement
First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2012**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Acceding Country Croatia^{*}, the Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia^{*}, Montenegro^{*}, Iceland^{**} and Serbia^{*}, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, San Marino and Andorra associate themselves with this statement.

2. Let me first of all congratulate you, Mr Chairman, for taking up this very important post and assure you that we will fully support you in your efforts to achieve a successful outcome of this session.

Mr. Chairman,

3. The successfully concluded NPT Review Conference in 2010 and the Conclusions and Recommendations adopted provide a good starting point for the next Review Cycle ahead of us. This first PrepCom meeting should pave the way for a smooth start of the new Review Cycle by agreeing promptly on procedural matters, reaffirm the commitment of all NPT States Parties to implement, in a balanced manner, the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan, have an exchange and share information on efforts and progress in implementing the Action Plan, and review relevant developments on issues that are absent or inadequately reflected in the Action Plan, such as universal adherence and implementation of Article X of the NPT.

4. The entry into force of the New START Treaty at the beginning of last year is a visible sign of progress on the path towards nuclear disarmament that needs to be sustained. At the same time, we continue to be deeply concerned at the persistent impasse, for over a decade, in the Conference on

* Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process

** Iceland remains an EFTA country and member of the European Economic Area

Disarmament, thereby preventing it from fulfilling its mandate and in particular its failure to start negotiations on an FMCT.

5. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and the risk that non-state actors, in particular terrorists, gain access to such weapons, continue to be a major threat to international peace and security that calls for a global approach, in addition to actions at the national and regional levels. In this context, the European Union stresses the need for compliance with obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009), and calls for improved nuclear security for high radioactive sources. Consistent with the longstanding and significant support provided by the EU to global nuclear security efforts, we have actively contributed to the outcome of both the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits.

6. Nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, together with confidence and transparency, are vital aspects of collective security. The European Union has long stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to all these issues that require to be strengthened by the international community.

7. Effective multilateralism, prevention and international cooperation are the three main goals of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The EU promotes universal adherence to and full implementation of all non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions, in particular the NPT, not only through diplomatic means and initiatives, but also through practical training and assistance. We will underline and illustrate this through working papers that we will table at this PrepCom, as well as through information events and further interventions during this meeting.

8. The EU is a major donor to international organisations in this field, such as the IAEA, the CTBTO, OPCW and the BTWC-Implementation Support Unit, thereby providing support to more than 100 countries. We are dedicated to support and reinforce verification mechanisms, such as the IAEA Safeguards system including the Additional Protocol, so as to ensure full compliance of all IAEA and NPT Member States with international obligations. Effective verification enhances mutual confidence and ensures the credibility of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and conventions. Detected non-compliance requires taking appropriate action. The EU, in this respect, reaffirms the role of the UN Security Council as the final arbiter of international peace and security, including in cases of non-compliance.

Mr Chairman,

9. Today, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is more important than ever. It remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI, and for the responsible development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV and in conformity

with Articles I, II and III. The EU emphasises the importance of universalizing the NPT and calls on States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, the European Union is actively contributing to the global efforts to seek a safer world for all and create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT, in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

10. The European Union is actively pursuing, without delay and in a balanced manner, the implementation of the forward-looking Action Plan set out in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which is designed to strengthen the three pillars of the Treaty and calls upon all NPT States Parties to do the same. In this regard, the EU welcomes the Nuclear Weapons States follow-up meetings to the NPT Review Conference as well as initiatives of EU Non-nuclear Weapons States promoting the implementation of the 2010 final document.

Furthermore, the EU strongly supports the recommendations by the 2010 NPT Review Conference for implementing the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East, which include in particular the holding of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. We have directly contributed to this process through two EU seminars, in 2008 and in 2011. The seminar "to promote confidence building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle East" hosted in Brussels in July last year saw broad and high level participation and produced an in-depth and useful discussion. In the run-up to the 2012 Conference, and beyond, the EU looks forward to working together with the Facilitator and all concerned and interested parties, including by follow up initiatives to the July 2011 seminar.

11. The international community continues to be faced with major proliferation challenges, which must be addressed in a resolute way in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT regime. Iran's nuclear programme defying many UNSC and IAEA BoG resolutions and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) testing of a nuclear explosive device and delivery mechanisms are most worrying examples in this regard. The same can be said regarding Syria's non-compliance with its Safeguards agreement and continued non-cooperation with the IAEA, which remains to be addressed by the UNSC.

12. These issues raise grave concerns and have led the EU, in particular in the case of Iran, to engage into renewed efforts aimed at finding a negotiated solution. Our objective remains to reach a comprehensive long-term settlement, which would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, ensuring that all obligations under the NPT are met by Iran, while fully respecting Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The most recent meeting of representatives from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, led by the EU High Representative, with

Iran on 14 April 2012 in Istanbul is a clear example of our determination to work towards achieving a diplomatic solution involving the full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. We hope that by launching a sustained process of serious dialogue with Iran, we will be able to achieve concrete results at an early stage. Iran needs to engage in meaningful discussions on practical confidence-building steps in order to address the international community's concerns on its nuclear programme. We call on all UN Member States to support these efforts by fully implementing relevant Security Council Resolutions.

13. We strongly condemn the North-Korean launch conducted on April 13th, which constitutes a serious violation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718 and 1874. We strongly urge the DPRK to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We call on the DPRK to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, and provide the IAEA with the requested access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities.

Mr. Chairman,

14. Let me highlight some of the efforts the EU has undertaken with regard to the implementation of the 2010 Conclusions and Recommendations. More detailed information is provided in the Working paper No NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/45, which we have submitted to this conference and to which we will refer to under the various cluster discussions.

15. With regard to the implementation of Action 9, the European Union, at the first Conference of States Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty, offered to support the implementation of the Treaty and the establishment and work of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE). The European Union started its work on identifying instruments and means to actively support the AFCONE, depending on concrete assistance needs to be determined.

16. With regard to the implementation of Action 15, the European Union remains deeply concerned by the ongoing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, including the persistent failure of the CD to agree on a Programme of Work, despite recent attempts to achieve consensus. The European Union has appealed repeatedly for the immediate launch of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which is an indispensable step towards fulfilment of the obligations and final objective enshrined in Article VI of the NPT. The European Union and its Member States are therefore committed to engage, in order to make progress on Actions 6, 7 and 15, in substantive discussions on all the core issues on the CD agenda. By the same token, the European Union continues to call on the CD to consider the question of the enlargement of its membership. The EU has presented during the UNGA debate on 27-29 July 2011 concrete options to overcome the deadlock in the CD in order to take multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations forward.

17. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is of crucial importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and the implementation of Actions 10 to 12, the EU in all its diplomatic outreach activities constantly called on all States, in particular the remaining Annex 2 States that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty at an early date. We welcome the latest ratifications by the Central African Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Ghana, Guinea, Guatemala and Indonesia. In implementing Actions 13 and 14, the European Union continued to provide significant support (more than € 10 million in the last 5 years) for the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat to strengthen the verification system. The latest Council Decision (2010/461/CFSP) adopted on 26 July 2010 provides for € 5.3 million and a new Council Decision is under preparation.

18. In order to promote Action 19, the European Union organised several topical conferences, the last one in February 2012, and supports with more than € 2 million the establishment and strengthening of a network of independent European Think Tanks and NGOs via the so called European Union Non-Proliferation Consortium. In implementing Action 33, the European Union contributed with € 5 million towards modernising the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and further contributions in a similar range to this important project are envisaged.

19. The European Union also supports IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and is one of the main contributors to the Nuclear Security Fund, with a level of funding of nearly € 31 million since 2004, complemented by individual contributions of EU Member States. Under the European Union Instrument for Stability (IfS), nearly €300 million are being dedicated during the period 2007 – 2013 to CBRN risk mitigation, out of which about one third will be dedicated to the European Union Initiative called Regional CBRN Centres of Excellence. Its objective is to strengthen the institutional capacity to fight against the CBRN risk worldwide. Finally, the European Union uses several of its financial instruments to support both the IAEA and cooperation with third countries in creating the necessary regulatory and institutional basis for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology with a total amount of at least € 150 million per year. Part of this funding is implemented in third countries through the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund to which the European Union, including through individual contributions from its Member States, is the second major contributor.

20. These are just a few examples and you will find much more information in our Working papers and other contributions to this conference.

Mr. Chairman,

21. Let me conclude this statement by reiterating that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains for the European Union the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and that we are working to implement, without delay and in a balanced manner, the forward-looking actions by the 2010 Conference. This Preparatory Committee should pave the way for a smooth start of the new Review Cycle. Mindful of the general objectives of the Treaty,

and against the background of developments since the last Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee, by its third meeting, should arrive at recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference on areas where further action might be required. The European Union will in particular work towards strengthening the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the non-proliferation regime through making the conclusion of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol the verification standard, under Article III of the NPT. The European Union continues to see the need for arriving at a common understanding of States Parties on how to respond effectively to a State Party's withdrawal from the NPT.

22. In our Working Papers to this PrepCom, we further demonstrate the contributions made, and point out areas where the European Union identified needs for further action and increased efforts by all States Parties.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.